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Abstract
Don Ihde and Lambros Malafouris (Philosophy and Technology 32:195–214, 2019) have argued that “we are homo faber 
not just because we make things but also because we are made by them.” The emphasis falls on the idea that the things that 
we create, use, rely on—that is, those things with which we engage—have a recursive effect on human existence. We make 
things, but we also make arrangements, many of which are long-standing, material, social, normative, economic, institu-
tional, and/or political, and many of which are supported by various technologies, including AI, more and more. Critical 
theorists, such as Habermas, have argued that we need a “depth” or critical hermeneutics (one that combines hermeneutical 
understanding with scientific explanation) to provide a full account of this kind of recursivity. For Habermas, the explana-
tory aspect of critical hermeneutics has been modeled on neo-Marxist and neo-Freudian theories. We propose a new critical 
hermeneutical approach that uses the tools of embodied cognitive science, affordance theory, material engagement theory, 
and the concept of the socially extended mind.
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The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; 
the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist. 
(Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy)
1 Introduction
We start by endorsing a view explicated by Ihde and Mala-
fouris (2019): most succinctly, “we make things which 
in turn make us” (p. 196). As they note, this is not a new 
thought (see the above quotation from Marx). Ihde and 
Malafouris deepen the thought, however, by proposing a 
postphenomenological material engagement theory. The 
focus of material engagement theory (MET) is on the mate-
rial things that we encounter and use, the material culture 
that shapes our lifeworld practices. MET, as they explain, 
is grounded in the sciences of archaeology and anthropol-
ogy and takes the long-term (evolutionary) and compara-
tive view. Postphenomenology stakes out an approach in the 
philosophy of contemporary technology and emphasizes the 
things of “modern technologies and new forms of digital 
culture” (p. 196). The approach they take is clearly interdis-
ciplinary and it could be understood as engaging with such 
issues in either or both of two ways: as descriptive and/or 
as critical. As descriptive it explains how fabrication and 
material culture shape human life and evolution. Thus Ihde 
and Malafouris argue:
More than any other animal, humans evolve by cre-
ating new materials (from wood, stone and ceramic, 
through to metals, alloys, glass, paper, concrete, plas-
tics and silicon) and material forms (surfaces, bound-
aries, lines, containers, houses, wheels, signs, maps, 
images, letters, documents, machines etc.), and by 
developing skilled practices opening up to new socio-
technical possibilities (sometimes enabling and some-
times disabling) (p. 197).
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The last phrase signals the critical opening: the idea 
that we can examine these practices and processes and say 
whether they enable human flourishing or disable it. This 
is not an opening pursued by Ihde and Malafouris in their 
interdisciplinary project; they stay much closer to the neutral 
descriptive task, suggesting that “[t]echnology is at the heart 
of human becoming but it does not provide or in any sense 
predetermine a specific direction of change (progressive or 
other)” (p. 199). Again, however, they point to an opening 
for critique:
There is nothing inherently good or bad about a new 
technological development, but given the importance 
that they have in human life and our ways of thinking, 
it pays to study in more detail the specific effects they 
might have on us. The challenge here is not how to 
liberate ourselves from technology: it is how to turn 
technology into an instrument of liberation and critical 
self-consciousness (p. 204).
This position shares a deep similarity to traditional Frank-
furt School critical theory at least to the extent that, like 
the critical theorists, it places our broad-scale human prac-
tices and activities at the heart of what we call the mind and 
cognition, and stresses the essential connection between the 
historical, technological, social modes of production, and 
how participation in these sociomaterial practices plays a 
role in structuring forms of consciousness.
MET, we note, builds on embodied, extended and enac-
tive views of cognition (Malafouris 2013). Our own materi-
ality, our own bodies, including our brains, are shaped, over 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic timescales, by our material 
practices, our use of things, our habitual movements and 
our innovative actions. This approach emphasizes a rela-
tional ontology—our bodies and bodily actions are coupled 
to things in the environment—a view that can be modeled 
on Gibson’s (1979) notion of affordances (understood rela-
tionally) or Dewey’s (1934) notion of situation, which is 
never reducible to an agent-free environment, but neces-
sarily includes the agent (see Gallagher 2017). The appeal 
to E-cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) 
allows Malafouris (2013) to develop a rich account of human 
agency.
By extending this account to a joint or collective agency 
we’ve suggested that MET must also take into account the 
very real factors of social interactions and institutions (Gal-
lagher and Ransom 2016). Material engagement with tools is 
clearly a catalyst for the social organization (Walls 2019) and 
any emphasis on niche construction in the human domain 
needs to account for the fact that the niche is always a social 
one. One can expand on Ihde and Malafouris’s observations 
about the examples of stone knapping (following Malafouris 
2013) and food preparation (following Wrangham 2009), 
to show that these material practices are necessarily social 
practices that already point to divisions of labor and insti-
tuted arrangements.
2  Socially extended cognitive institutions
Material engagements emerge from and are sustained in 
intersubjective interactions embedded in social and cultural 
practices. In this respect, the notion of a “socially extended 
cognitive institution” (Gallagher 2013; Gallagher et al. 2019; 
Slaby and Gallagher 2015) is helpful for understanding how 
not only tools and material things shape minds, but how 
larger structures (normative cultural practices and institu-
tions), which emerge out of, expand, and transform mate-
rial engagements, shape both human cognitive processes 
and social interactions in ways that are either enabling or 
disabling.
Slors (2019) defines cognitive institutions, following Gal-
lagher (2013, p. 6): “not only as institutions with which we 
accomplish certain cognitive processes but also… without 
[which] such cognitive processes would no longer exist.” A 
cognitive institution, succinctly, is any institution or organ-
ized social practice that serves an epistemic function in 
problem solving. A cognitive institution is formed by cog-
nitive (e.g., problem solving) practices that involve multiple 
interacting agents pursuing multiple interrelated tasks, and 
reciprocally, such interactions are shaped by instituted (nor-
mative) practices that extend our cognitive processes when 
we engage with them (that is, when we interact with, or are 
enactively coupled to them in the right way).
This includes, as an example, the legal system, which 
“enables an array of thoughts and actions that are unintel-
ligible without the concepts and procedural social routines 
associated with the law” (Slors 2019, p. 5; see Gallagher 
2013).1 The practice of law is constituted by cognitive and 
communicative processes instantiated in the cooperative 
activities of many agents who rely on conventional cogni-
tive schemas and, for example, rules of evidence provided by 
the legal institution itself. Reasoned judgments made in such 
contexts are specified as legal judgments precisely because 
they are made in such contexts. They are forms of cognition 
that depend on the large and complex system without which 
they could not happen.
Slors (2019) offers a useful distinction to clarify how 
the notion of a socially extended cognitive institution goes 
beyond extended-mind approaches that focus on hand-held 
tools and technologies. According to Slors, the kind of 
extended mind analysis, as found in Clark (2008), and as 
1 Other examples include cultural institutions, as well as economic 
markets (Gallagher et  al. 2019), and science itself (Slaby and Gal-
lagher 2015).
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features in MET (Malafouris 2013), is based on the idea of 
functional integration, a form of causal (or dynamical, recip-
rocally causal) coupling that allows for a tool or instrument 
to be integrated into the overall cognitive system. In contrast, 
the conception of the socially extended cognitive institu-
tion is based on what Slors calls a “symbiotic” arrangement, 
which he defines in terms of “task dependency.”
“Task dependency” is the extent to which the intel-
ligibility of a task depends on a larger whole of 
coordinated tasks. Task dependency is a notion that 
is connected with coordination and planning. It is a 
normative notion in the sense that high task depend-
ency means that tasks play specific roles in the overall 
organization of a cognitive system or a cultural cogni-
tive ecosystem; roles that can be played properly or 
improperly (Slors 2019, p. 18).
For example, the legal system is characterized by high 
task dependency since judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, 
clerk, and other officials are inter-defined in a holistic way, 
such that what an attorney does is understandable only by 
referring to what judges and prosecutors do. This means that 
there is a division of labor in a symbiotic system.
Division of labor involves a specific type of offloading, 
one which is typical for symbiotic cognition but not for 
extended [mind]. Every participant in a symbiotic sys-
tem profits from whatever the system as a whole offers 
(education, justice, social coordination) while contrib-
uting only a small part. The tasks, jobs and roles of 
others in the system co-define and enable one’s own 
task, but one does not have to perform them or even 
think about them, while nevertheless benefiting from 
the overall outcome of the system (Slors 2019, p. 30).
We can think of a cognitive institution as a set of human 
interrelationships embedded in a workspace of different 
tasks. Each task category may be defined by norms and 
practices, and by less formal and imperfect social interac-
tions that may involve a variety of biases. The concept of 
symbiotic arrangements clearly characterizes some forms of 
cognitive institutions, but, as Slors acknowledges, the con-
trast between functional integration and task dependency is 
a matter of degree. If, for example, the legal system is char-
acterized by high task dependency and low functional inte-
gration, this doesn’t necessarily generalize to all cognitive 
institutions. We have argued that the issue is more complex. 
Cognitive institutions vary in degree between task depend-
ency and functional integration depending on where one is 
looking in the system, or from what perspective one exam-
ines the system (Gallagher et al. 2019). From a systems per-
spective one may see high task dependency, whereas from 
the perspective of an individual agent who engages with 
the system, one may find a significant degree of functional 
integration. In the legal system, for example, a judge helps 
to enact the system but only by doing specific tasks that 
require material engagement with papers, law books, court-
rooms, gavels, benches, supporting technologies, and many 
other people. In this respect, to fully explicate the notion 
of a socially extended cognitive institution, to think of it 
less abstractly and closer to lifeworld effects, one still needs 
to think about the details captured by the kind of analyses 
found in postphenomenology and MET.
3  Revisiting critical depth hermeneutics
One can rightly ask whether we need a specific approach 
that will allow us to gain a critical perspective on both the 
material practices and the institutional arrangements that 
shape the ways we think and live together. Here we think 
it is fruitful to revisit the concept of critical hermeneutics 
as Jürgen Habermas conceives of it. Habermas (1971a) 
proposes the notion of a critical “depth” hermeneutics that 
brings into play Dilthey’s distinction between understand-
ing (Verstehen) and explanation (Erklärung). Dilthey distin-
guished hermeneutics as a methodology of the human and 
social sciences that involves understanding the meaning of 
individual and social expressions (including behaviors, texts, 
etc.). In contrast, he took the natural sciences to be offer-
ing causal explanations concerned to tell us how underlying 
mechanisms work. Habermas’ critique of hermeneutics [not 
only of Dilthey but also of Gadamer in their famous debate 
(see Habermas 1971b)] turned on the limitations of under-
standing since to simply understand what someone means 
doesn’t really tell us why they think the way they do. To 
put it in Ricoeur’s terms, Gadamer’s satisfaction with the 
understanding of meaning constituted a hermeneutics of 
trust, whereas Habermas’s critical hermeneutics starts with 
suspicion—that is, suspicion that something deeper is going 
on. Thus, Habermas proposes what he calls a ‘depth’ her-
meneutics—one that adds a causal explanation of a specific 
kind to the task of fully comprehending the other person, 
their expressions and behaviors—“a hermeneutics that can-
not be confined to the procedures of philology, but rather 
unite linguistic analysis with the psychological investiga-
tion of causal connections” (1971a, p. 217). The result is an 
“explanatory understanding” that emphasizes context and 
that could be captured in narrative (1971a, pp. 272–273).
Habermas conceives of depth hermeneutics as incorpo-
rating what critical theorists call the critical sciences. Spe-
cifically, Habermas proposes Marx’s (economic) critique of 
ideology and Freud’s psychoanalysis as models of critical 
science. What makes them critical is that both of them take 
the real action to be happening beneath the manifestations of 
ideology and consciousness—that is, in the mechanisms of 
capitalist economics and the meta-psychological workings 
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of the unconscious, respectively. For example, to really com-
prehend why people or social groups think the way they do 
or behave the way they do, we need to explain how pro-
cesses and arrangements in institutional structures or eco-
nomic substructures impose constraints on us and produce 
systematically distorted communications or specific kinds of 
social arrangements and ideological justifications for them. 
It’s not enough to know what someone means when they 
express their preference for a particular brand of mobile 
phone, for example; one needs to ask whether their prefer-
ence has been shaped by advertising practices organized by 
specific information technology firms driven primarily by 
the profit motive.
Habermas’s (1987) later distinction between system and 
lifeworld introduces further nuances into his analysis. Sim-
ply put, however, we need to explain how systems (e.g., 
bureaucratic, corporate, institutional structures) shape, con-
strain, or “colonize” our everyday lifeworld and our inter-
subjective relations.
If Marx and Freud offer good models for critical sciences, 
it’s not clear that a critical hermeneutics is limited to their 
particular approaches. The question is whether other sci-
ences can operate on this critical side. True to the methodo-
logical orientation of depth hermeneutics, there are good 
reasons to be suspicious of a critical hermeneutics that draws 
on resources from natural and human sciences without criti-
cally evaluating the ideological implications of that science 
itself. There is, as Adorno and Horkheimer argue, a particu-
lar Enlightenment understanding of scientific knowledge, 
which is inseparable from control or domination:
Enlightenment stands in the same relationship to 
things as the dictator to human beings. He knows 
them to the extent that he can manipulate them. The 
man of science knows things to the extent that he can 
make them. Their “in-itself” becomes “for him.” In 
their transformation the essence of things is revealed 
as always the same, a substrate of domination (1947, 
p. 6).
Accordingly, it is incumbent to demonstrate that the par-
ticular approach within cognitive science that we are using 
in the service of a depth hermeneutics does not uncritically 
reproduce the very same ideological understandings of the 
individual, the social, the political, and knowledge in gen-
eral, that a critical approach is meant to unsettle or call into 
question.
The meaning of individuality, as well as the phenomeno-
logical character of concrete immediate experience, is struc-
tured by its position within a sociomaterial ensemble, much 
like Slors’ understanding of task dependency, where an 
action is given meaning in the context of a broader scope of 
activity. This has the potential to critically challenge a par-
ticular liberal understanding of the meaning of the individual 
that emerges out of the sociohistorical and material relations 
of late western capitalism—something that Sartre also inter-
rogates in The Critique of Dialectical Reason. In a patently 
Hegelian tone, he claims “Immediate experience reveals 
being at its most concrete, but it takes it at its most superfi-
cial level and remains in the realm of abstractions” (1960, 
p. 95). The individual viewpoint remains abstract in its 
concreteness precisely because the individual is not its own 
foundation—we make history, while at the same time we are 
made by history. As Sartre points out, to experience one’s 
self as a mere member of a series—to be isolated among a 
plurality of isolations—is still a kind of reciprocal form of 
being with others (p. 256). That is, even to experience one’s 
self as an atomistic individual is a condition borne out of a 
sociomaterial, historical situation, and is always given mean-
ing in relation to others.
The social practices and material transactions that 
emerge out of capitalist exchange relations produce what 
Sohn-Rethel (1978) calls a social attitude of practical sol-
ipsism. This is different from the strong solipsistic meta-
physical position that the self is the only thing that really 
exists; rather, it describes the sort of implicit attitude that 
emerges for individuals in commodity exchange relations 
where each agent’s interests and property are supposed to 
exist in complete independence of one another. The agents 
who are engaged in these interactions engage with others as 
if from a position in which they, themselves—their feelings, 
interests, needs and desires, in addition to their sphere of 
private property—are socially and economically instituted as 
an isolated unity set apart from the social structure in which 
these trade interactions take place. Interaction is structured 
by the practice of reciprocal exchange of economic value, 
and, for communities that are set up this way, the relation-
ships among individuals in public life come to resemble the 
instituted economic relationships among the things that they 
exchange.
From the perspective of social institutions, it is not simply 
that the practical structure of exchange relations operates as 
a form of cognitive institution, helping people with the task 
of exchanging and consuming commodities (see Gallagher 
et al. 2019), but also there is a particular understanding of 
what it means to be an individual that is instituted within 
these sociomaterial practices of economic exchange. Sohn-
Rethel states further, “[The agents] consider themselves to 
have acted in self-interest although they have merely obeyed 
the law of the exchange nexus [within which their interaction 
is situated]” (p. 42).
Developing this idea of an ideologically and materially 
motivated institution of the individual as an atomized par-
ticular, Mészáros (2010) describes the way in which this 
understanding of individuality has become formalized and 
methodologically reified in the practices of the human sci-
ences, including psychology and the cognitive sciences. He 
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argues that the monolithic imperative to investigate cognitive 
phenomena solely through the lens of a methodological indi-
vidualism prescribes an untenable separation of the social 
from the individual. The idea that the individual as entangled 
in the social world—a view that is required for any perspec-
tive that is critical of sociohistorical institutions, practices, 
and attitudes—is constitutively occluded by approaches to 
cognition that make the individual the sole putative locus of 
everything involved in thought, meaning, and agency. In the 
framework of methodological individualism ideological ten-
dencies can only be interpreted as an aggregate co-incidence 
of individual doxastic states. On this view, ‘society’ or ‘his-
tory’ is posited as either the static objective stimulus of these 
individual mental states, or as if these beliefs all emanated 
from a common, discrete source.
We think that this is precisely where MET and postphe-
nomenology, along with embodied, extended, and enactive 
cognitive science and the analysis of socially extended cog-
nitive institutions have the potential to contribute to a deeper 
and more comprehensive hermeneutics, especially insofar 
as these approaches to cognition are not theoretically bound 
to methodological individualism in the ways that cognitiv-
ist, internalist, and neuro-centric models are. Enactive and 
ecological approaches emphasize the sense-making engage-
ments and patterns of the transaction between the organism 
and its environment—that is, like MET, they do not estab-
lish, a priori, a single substantial unit of analysis prior to the 
investigation of some particular phenomenon or situation 
(Malafouris 2019). In the archeology and anthropology of 
MET, we can define the details of how material practices and 
the things themselves shape individual and collective agen-
cies; in postphenomenology we can orient the analysis to 
consider the role of contemporary information technologies 
in enabling and constraining our communicative practices; 
using the E-approaches we can map out the landscape of 
affordances (Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014) and the road-
blocks of disaffordances that define our possibilities or get 
in the way of human flourishing. Likewise, by analyzing the 
specific arrangements of cognitive institutions such as legal, 
educational, health-care, military, market, etc. systems, we 
can ask how such arrangements support or undermine inter-
subjective recognition and individual autonomy, conceived 
in terms of relational autonomy, thereby giving us a way to 
ask critical questions about how they might be adjusted or 
transformed with a view to addressing and reducing institu-
tionally generated distortions in intersubjective interactions.
We are not claiming, however, that these approaches 
already express an explicit critical stance in their methodo-
logical foundations. Rather, if a critical depth hermeneutics 
seeks to make connections with approaches within disci-
plines that deal with the mind and the structure of cognition, 
these aforementioned theoretical orientations appear to be 
the best-suited fellow travelers for such a project. Indeed, 
there are already some studies that put these e-approaches 
to use in the context of a critical theory perspective. Branca-
zio (2019), for example, gives an account of culturally pro-
duced gender norms and their influence on minimal forms of 
embodied agency; De Jaegher (2013) shows how enactivism 
can address questions of patriarchy; Slaby and Gallagher 
(2015; also see Choudhury and Slaby 2012; Slaby 2010) 
address the culture of neuroscience research from a critical 
perspective; and Gallagher (in press) explores the implica-
tions of embodied intersubjectivity for critical perspectives 
on concepts of reification and autonomy.
4  Discussion: from postphenomenology 
to a critical theory of institutions
To conclude we’ll discuss some examples that show a range 
of critical perspectives from postphenomenology, to MET, 
to a critical theory of institutions. A first example involves 
discussions of media and technology in the postphenom-
enology context. Hayler (2015) shows how a certain photo-
graphic grammar comes along with techniques, such as tilt 
shift photography (the use of camera movements that change 
the orientation and/or position of the lens) in a way that can 
manipulate our perspectives. Photographic techniques can 
change the way that we see things; in some cases it can make 
visible what had previously been invisible. Hayler shows 
that the use of cultural media—photography, cinema, and 
video cameras—continues to have reflexive (looping) effects 
on how we see and understand things, and even on how we 
move. Our over-exposure to certain media forms a grammar, 
“rules that we know, but don’t know that we know” (Hayler 
2015)—that is, rules that we follow without knowing that we 
do so. Such an evolved grammar structures our expectations 
shows us different possibilities, and in effect, creates new 
affordances for action.
What one can say of media and technology, one can also 
say of certain material designs that are closer to our bodies 
and constraining of our movement—namely bodily deco-
rations and manners of dress. Beyond the proverb, clothes 
really do make men and women; clothes impact most imme-
diately how we move, and then how we act and what roles 
we can play, helping to construct specific social structures 
that again loop around to reinforce the customs and cos-
tumes that we don. McCarroll (2015) builds on the distinc-
tion between body image and body schema (see Gallagher 
2005), and shows that the clothes that we wear are not sim-
ply a matter of dressing up our body images, but can actu-
ally take hold of our body-schematic processes and, within 
specific social settings, operate to colonize our movements 
and actions. Clothes can impose a specific behavioral pattern 
on our actions by defining (delimiting) movement.
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The acquisition of [such patterns] as a largely invisible 
process as strictures of polite behavior, structures of 
clothing, and saturation of visual imagery act upon 
the consciously adopted habits of dress and behavior 
related to body image, and permeate the preconscious 
body schema (McCarroll 2015).
Clothes can have real physical and social effects and 
can actually support the norms of institutions. McCarroll 
demonstrates her point with the example of the corset, a 
piece of technology that acted as something of a straight-
jacket on the bodies of Victorian women and supported 
their defined role in society. The evidence for this she finds 
in J. M. Barrie’s play The Admirable Crichton (1902). As 
portrayed in this play, young women in Victorian London 
required intensive attention from their individual maids sim-
ply in order to dress. Dresses were buttoned from the back; 
corsets prevented the women from bending to tie their own 
shoes, which required stylish and complex lacing up. The 
corset and everything that goes with it—all the invisible and 
unmentionable garments—rob them of free movement and 
prevent them from engaging in certain types of action. The 
daughters are in effect dressed to be dependent and help-
less and are pushed into a very restrictive, corseted social 
structure.
Clothes, and more generally, fashions, are like technolo-
gies or institutions that we wear. They can impose rigid limi-
tations on movement and on daily practices and seriously 
shape our social customs. We may think that today we’ve 
been liberated from these types of clothes—although, of 
course this is not the case in all cultures, and particularly 
there continue to exist strictures on women’s dress in the 
name of modesty, decency, God, or business acumen. Even 
liberating fashions continue to be imposed since a woman is 
still expected to dress like a woman and man like a man—
especially in specific settings.
As John Dewey noted in his own time, clothes, fashions, 
and the design of the immediate material world continue to 
operate as institutions—aesthetic institutions. Fashion, for 
example, is an object of intense admiration which “intensi-
fies the sense of immediate living.”
Bodily scarification, waving feathers, gaudy robes, 
shining ornaments of gold and silver, of emerald and 
jade, formed the contents of esthetic arts…. Domestic 
utensils, furnishings of tent and house, rugs, mats, jars, 
pots, bows, spears, were wrought with such delighted 
care that today we hunt them out and give them places 
of honor in our art museums. Yet in their own time and 
place, such things were enhancements of the processes 
of everyday life (Dewey 1934, p. 6).
Whether they were enhancements or impositions may 
be open to question. The larger point here is that materials, 
designs, media, cultural preferences and practices, and 
institutions continue to be what they are. We often find 
ourselves in good ones, like loose and comfortable clothes 
that permit a lot of free movement, or in bad ones that 
tie us up in tight and constrictive processes that discour-
age innovative actions. Institutions, like clothes, and even 
more clearly like tools and instruments, can enhance or 
delimit an affordance space (Brincker 2014)—a set of pos-
sible actions across a range of physical and social settings.
A postphenomenological analysis may show that spe-
cific technologies in our digital culture can reorganize 
human intentionality (Verbeek 2008, 2011), or our com-
municative practices, and in a critical fashion it can ask 
about the gains or losses that such reorganization brings 
with it (Ihde 2009; Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015). Such 
an investigation can ask how digital technologies impact 
our cognitive processes and our social relations. Certain 
types of technologies may lead to behavioral addictions, 
or to social isolation, or, as we have seen in recent times, 
they can certainly promote misinformation and political 
polarization. The aim of high-tech product design, for 
example, is not always to enhance individual autonomy. 
The intention is not just to make the design stand out and 
attract, but to shape the practices of the end user so that the 
product is used in an almost automatic way (Eyal 2014). 
Likewise, some theorists argue that the ubiquity of digital 
technologies can impair the user’s ability to attend to those 
things that might otherwise matter (e.g., Wu 2017). Wil-
liams (2018, p. 7) (a former Google employee) describes 
how designers aim to maximize the time a user spends on a 
particular platform; he suggests that the technology indus-
try doesn’t design products; it designs users. This shifts 
the focus from the pieces of technology that make us who 
we are to the social and cognitive institutions which may 
be either solving problems or creating them.
The postphenomenological orientation of MET, which 
incorporates enactive-ecological-and embodied concep-
tions of the mind, has, as part of a depth hermeneutics, 
the potential to add both theoretical and ethical gravity to 
existing critiques. We can see this, for example, in Har-
vey’s (2012) discussion of ‘the right to the city’:
The right to the city is … far more than a right of indi-
vidual or group access to the resources that the city 
embodies: it is the right to change and reinvent the city 
more after our hearts desire. It is, moreover, a collec-
tive rather than an individual right, since reinventing 
the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of col-
lective power over the processes of urbanization…To 
claim the right to the city in the sense I mean it here is 
to claim some kind of shaping power…over the ways 
in which our cities are made and remade, and to do so 
in a fundamental and radical way (pp. 4–5).
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In this account, this right is not describable in terms of 
any one particular form of codified social activity, or some-
thing guaranteed through any one particular type of static 
legal or social institution. Instead it refers to a more global 
right for collective democratic control of materially shaping 
the city as an endogenously-motivated process by the very 
people who produce the labor that makes this shaping pos-
sible in the first place. That is, there is something about the 
right to the city that, if it is the expression of a genuine right, 
should necessarily be expressed in sociomaterial terms: a 
socially instituted process that is indistinguishable from the 
power expressed in the artifactual layout of the city, and its 
transformations over time.
5  Conclusion
The artifactual, technological, residential, locomotive, 
industrial, etc., layout of the city produces forms of life and 
specific ways of moving around; it produces a sociomate-
rial landscape of affordances and produces and sediments 
social habits of engagement and interaction. It patterns the 
flow of people, things, and goods in the processes of inter-
action, transaction, and engagement. Taking seriously the 
claim that mind, habits, forms of thought, etc. emerge out 
of the ongoing dialectical engagements with the artifactual 
environment (Ransom 2019) entails that the only way for 
people to maintain autonomous control over their forms of 
life, community, and general welfare is to ensure that there 
exist democratic institutions that actually secure the power 
to effect these material conditions themselves. This might 
involve access to public transportation, housing, jobs, the 
right to freely gather in public spaces, among other things. 
In effect, a depth or critical hermeneutics based on postphe-
nomenological, enactive approaches argues that social insti-
tutions can express the democratic will of the people only to 
the extent that they afford the possibility of exercising con-
trol over the material transformations of their surrounding 
shared environment, as Harvey (2012) suggests. Certainly, 
the artifactual composition of the city does not determine the 
way that people engage with the environment. The intended 
function of an artifact and the affordances that it is designed 
to provide do not anticipate all of the possible uses that we 
may put it to, and such innovations in use sometimes reveal 
unexpected horizons of the artifact’s prescribed use or func-
tion. However, the possibilities for democratic control, in the 
critical sense that we suggest, are better supported not just 
by the “ad hoc affordances” (Cosentino 2019) of creative, 
lateral forms of manipulation and public engagement, but 
also through forms of democratic influence over the artifac-
tual layout of those spaces themselves.
Without the actual possibility of exercising demo-
cratic control on the sociomaterial landscape, democratic 
institutions lack, so to speak, substance. If, in fact, homo 
faber is defined as an animal who is both creating and cre-
ated by the sociomaterial world, then democratic autonomy 
consists in a notion of rights that are necessarily sociomate-
rial in character. This is a conception of rights opposed to 
many of the insututions that already play a primary role in 
structuring the unfolding of urbanization in the 21st Cen-
tury—namely the institutions of private development of 
the urban landscape and the monolithic structuring role of 
capital accumulation, which often shape the sociomaterial 
landscapes in ways that are inimical to the interests of the 
people who live in them.
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